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Fatima M. Albar, Antonie J. Jetter 
Portland State University, Engineering and Technology Management Dept., Portland, OR - USA   
 
Abstract--Heuristics are simple rules of thumbs for problem 
solving that follow a logic that is quite different from 
consequential logic. They have long been regarded, as an 
inferior technique for decision making that is the source of 
irrational decision behavior. Recently, decision making 
researchers have demonstrated that some heuristics are highly 
efficient and can compete with complex decision models in some 
application domains. This paper explores the different streams 
of research, summarizes the state of the art decision making 
model, and discusses its implications for complex decisions in 
engineering and technology management. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The essence of management is decision making. Success 
in competitive environments often depends on quality 
decisions despite huge amounts of information and large 
numbers of alternatives. Making a wrong decision can cause 
a company to lose its market or to run out of business. 
Companies do not only need systems and models to improve 
decision making, but they also need to counsel humans to 
improve the ways they think, analyze information and make 
decisions.  
Decision making is centrally concerned with the process 
by which alternatives are evaluated and options selected for 
implementation [1]. Decision making can be regarded as an 
outcome of mental processes leading to the selection of a 
course of actions among several alternatives. To make 
successful decisions, decision makers have to clearly define 
the goals to be achieved, build a mental representation of the 
situation or the system to be managed, predict or forecast the 
future and make plans for actions under different situations, 
while monitoring their own (and the organization’s) strategies 
for gathering and processing information [2]. 
Decision making is not a one-step process, but a 
compound process where three components interact with 
each other: the decision parameters, the decision making 
process and the decision implementation [3]. The process by 
which decision makers choose the decision parameters they 
will use to evaluate decision alternatives usually involves 
cognitive biases constrained by past events and individual 
cognitive styles [3]. The decision making process is the stage 
where all alternatives are evaluated to produce a final choice. 
This process can be based on reasoning or it can be an 
emotional process. It can be rational or irrational and can be 
based on explicit or tacit assumptions [3]. In the final step, 
actions need to be planned and decisions  implemented [3].  
For a long time, good decision making was considered 
equivalent to a rational choice between decision alternatives 
that is free of biases and emotions. Heuristics, simple rules of 
thumbs, which are based on common sense and used to solve 
problems quickly, were considered inferior decision making 
techniques that result in irrational behavior. Recently, this 
view has changed and psychological research [4], as well as 
popular management publications [5, 6], stress the usefulness 
of simple heuristics.  
Drawing from psychological and managerial research, this 
paper reviews different decision theories that can contribute 
to our understanding of how to improve decision making 
processes. It starts with presenting the ideal of rational 
decision theory (section 2) and by contrasting it with 
behavioral decision theories (section 3) that are based on the 
observation of real-world decisions. Section 4 describes 
decision theoretical approaches, such as the theory of 
bounded rationality and research on fast and frugal heuristics, 
that integrate the normative ideal of rational decision making 
and the observed irrational behavior. This section furthermore 
discusses recent research on simple decision heuristics in 
real-world settings. Section 5 discusses the findings and 
section 6 gives an outlook on future research. 
 
II. RATIONAL DECISION THEORY 
 
Rational decision theory was derived from laws that 
psychologists believed to be the laws of human reasoning [2]: 
Decision makers identify the best decision to take by 
computing, with perfect accuracy, how different decision 
alternatives will play out. They choose the alternative that 
maximizes the value of outcomes to them [7]. This choice is 
based on two assumptions about the future: a guess about the 
future state of the world which is contingent upon the choice 
and a guess about how the decision maker feels about the 
future when he experiences it [9]. In many real-world 
problems, the exact consequences of the choice are unknown. 
Uncertainty may exist because some processes are vague at 
the fundamental level, or decision makers are ignorant of the 
driving mechanism which makes the outcomes look uncertain 
to them, or because of dependency on unexpected future 
events [9]. Uncertainty can be modeled through probabilities. 
Rational decision theory relies on an extensive use of 
logic and mathematical models to represent decision 
situations. The strength of these rational approaches to 
decision making is in their rigor. Working within the decision 
theoretic framework allows one to identify answers and 
weigh the alternatives within the framework. These 
approaches encompass a substantial amount of educational 
content that is straightforward to teach and to test. [8] 
Although there are many mathematical decision making 
approaches, few of them are actually used. Rather than using 
formal methods or following systematic procedures, 
managers usually make decisions by reflecting on action or 
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 having an understanding only of the immediate situation and 
‘surface’ appropriate courses of action. Some blame this on 
the mathematical complexity or time limitation  [10] [11], 
others blame the limited applicability of models [8]. Gerald 
&Smith [8] found that there are just a few decision situations 
that managers routinely face, which can effectively be 
addressed by decision analytic techniques. They attribute that 
to a lack of sufficient information about problems, 
alternatives, contingencies and outcomes. Uncertainty is not 
usually localized in a few easily identified contingencies, but 
is rather highly diffused [12]. Rational models cannot offer 
enough assistance in identifying the problem, predicting, 
measuring, quantifying, or generating alternatives and other 
elements decision makers need to analyze before making 
decisions [8]  
 
III. BEHAVIORAL “IRRATIONAL” DECISION THEORY 
 
Behavioral decision research is concerned about how 
people process information and how they make judgments. 
Studies in the individual psychology of making choice have 
identified different cognitive and emotional limitations that 
bind human rationality and produce systematic errors [9]. At 
the same time, other research shows that every day decision 
behavior is “smart” and people can use intuitive techniques to 
make good decisions. When they are asked about the rational 
reasons behind their decisions, they use external cues as 
reasons for their decisions [9, 12, 13], even if they are not 
sure why they made that choice [9, 14].  
In order to make a decision, our brains develop cognitive 
maps and use them in different ways. The following sections 
describe how we develop and use these maps and how they 
relate to simple heuristics in decision making. 
 
A. Insight and Cognitive Maps 
Our brains develop expectancy or cognitive representation 
of “what leads to what” based on knowledge and experience 
that we have learnt. These representations are called 
cognitive maps [14]. The knowledge we learn may not be 
applied and tested until later, when there is an incentive to 
perform. Psychologists refer to this phenomenon as the 
concept of latent (hidden) learning [14].   
By developing cognitive maps, individuals have their own 
cognitive styles. Cognitive style is “the way people process 
and organize information and arrive at judgments or 
conclusions based on their observations” [14]. Kohler [15] 
concluded that we, as humans, are able to learn and  solve 
problems by insight which is defined as  “the sudden 
perception to a useful relationship that helps to solve a 
problem”. Other behaviorists define the insights as a 
combination of previous learned responses [4]. 
We make decisions subconsciously before starting to 
perform the analysis [16]. When we face a situation, we 
summarize it, recognize patterns of similarity between the 
new situation and what we had experienced or learnt, we fill 
in missing details based on previous experience and make 
assumptions. We thus develop a “sense of what counts as 
relevant” to identify the important cues, the goals that need to 
be accomplished and our expectations [16]. Recognized 
patterns include routines for responding and action scripts. 
Even if the situation is not exactly the same as previous 
situations we have experienced, we discover significant 
direction depending on our developed sense to know what 
will work and what will not, by evaluating the actions in our 
imagination or “mental simulation” [16]. This process of 
pattern matching and mental simulation is known as 
Recognition Primed Decision model (RPD) [5]. Figure1 
shows this model. 
 

Situation
Pattern 
Action
Scripts
Cues 
Mental 
Simulation 
Mental 
Modeling 
 
 
Figure1. Recognition Primed Decision Model [5] 
 
Intuition or “gut feelings” are not based on strategically 
analytical thinking; instead, intuition resembles a mental map 
or schema generated out of a cognitive conclusion based on 
practice, experiences and emotional inputs gained over years 
and gave the voice of wisdom [17].  
Intuition plays a significant role in managers’ daily work 
life especially, when decisions need to be made quickly or 
unexpectedly, because potential costs are associated with 
delays, or because of a high level of uncertainty, or because 
insufficient information pervades the situation. The 
importance of studying the cognitive style and the role of 
intuition in decision making increased especially with the 
increase of rapid and unprecedented change in the business 
environment where managers needed contemporary decision 
strategies [18].  Khatri and Alvin [19] found that intuitive 
synthesis is an important strategy process factor that 
managers rely on in their decision making process and it 
helps them improve the organization’s performance, 
especially in an unstable environment. Jon Anderson [20] , 
who studied problem solving and decision making 
approaches of 200 managers from eight different companies, 
579
PICMET 2009 Proceedings, August 2-6, Portland, Oregon USA © 2009 PICMET
 found that 32% of the managers primarily use intuition when 
making decisions and that the creative and innovative 
decision making styles were found more often in mangers 
that combined their intuitions with analytical thinking as an 
auxiliary. In addition, Burke [17] , found that 40% of 
managers, in his test,  made decisions such as interviewing, 
hiring, training, scheduling, performance appraisal, 
harassment complaints, patient care and safety issues based 
on their intuitions. Intuition helps managers to make 
predictions in situations where formal decision models cannot 
be helpful, especially when many changes happen in business 
environment, under uncertainty, or in situations that need 
flexibility [17].   
We need experts because they have developed many 
schemas from experience to guide problem solving in their 
fields; they are much better than novices at recognizing when 
each schema should be applied [14]. Applying the correct 
mental blueprint provides a proven route to solve a problem 
quickly and effectively. Since general heuristics make contact 
with a person’s knowledge base [16], experts depend on their 
long-term memory, and they can analyze problems 
deductively, selecting the retrieval cues needed by pulling the 
appropriate schema from memory and applying them to make 
a decision or solve a problem. Since novices do not have 
specialized schemas, they use general problem solving 
methods  that force them to solve a problem  in their working  
memory which is the weakest in the human mind [14]. World 
chess champion Gray Kasparov has developed chess schemas 
that enable him to defeat chess playing computers that use 
logical rules, some capable of logically analyze up to 100,000 
moves per second. Only Deep Blue with a weight of 1.4 tons 
could defeat the schemas in the 3-pound brain of Kasparov 
[4], [14]. 
Since we build a cognitive map out of each experience, 
we face and use it later when we face similar or close 
problems, psychologists tried to identify the common 
heuristics we use to solve problems by observing human 
behavior.   
 
B. Heuristics in Decision Making 
Because we seldom know the exact probability that would 
lead to the best outcome, we tend to apply certain heuristics 
from judgment of likelihood. Heuristics are “the general 
problem solving strategies that we apply for certain classes of 
situations” [14]; they are the rule of thumb for calculating 
certain kinds of numbers or solving certain problems. They 
can also be interpreted as rules following behavior that 
pursue a logic quite different than the consequential logic [9].  
In the early 1800s up until about 1970, the term heuristics 
was used to refer to useful and indispensable cognitive 
processes for solving problems that cannot be handled by 
logic and probability theory [21]. In the past 25 years, the 
definition of heuristics has changed to something that 
connotes almost its opposite meaning; instead of being useful 
and indispensable cognitive processes for solving problems, 
heuristics have come to connote an unreliable method to 
make decisions. In research on reasoning, judgment and 
decision making, heuristics have come to denote strategies 
that prevent one from finding out or discovering correct 
answers to problems that are assumed to be in the domain of 
probability theory [21].  “Heuristics and Biases” 
demonstrated that human judgment has shortcomings and 
biased conclusions under certain conditions. The naturalistic 
view sees the decision making process as a “situated activity 
that cannot be described or prescribed for in general terms” 
[8]. The Heuristics and Biases theory concluded that human 
inference is systematically biased and error-prone and 
suggests that the laws of inference are quick-and-dirty while 
the laws of probability are not. They accept the laws of 
probability and statistics as normative, but they disagree 
about whether or not humans can stand up to these norms [2, 
21]. Heuristics and Bias blame this inability of making good 
decisions to cognitive limitations. One of these limitations is 
a limit of working memory; where our cognitive system can 
process, remember, compare and recognize up to seven 
variables -plus or minus two- at the same time; if we have 
more variance we become ignorant about what is going to 
happen [22]. Gay Gould implies that “our minds are not built 
to work by rules of probabilities” (quoted by Gigerenzer [4] 
page 94). This  Heuristics and Bias point of view, represents 
the use of  heuristics as making decisions that “fly in the face 
of logic” [14], and they use the term heuristics to account for 
discrepancies between these rational strategies and actual 
human thought processes” [23]. 
The discrepancies between rational decision theory and 
observed decision behavior, such as the existence of 
cognitive maps and the use of heuristics, are subjects of an 
ongoing debate. Increasingly, there is reconciliation and 
integration of both streams of research, as the following 
section will demonstrate.  
 
IV. COMBINING RATIONAL AND IRRATIONAL 
THEORIES 
 
While some models of human behavior (like the rational 
choice theory) in the social sciences assumes that humans can 
be reasonably approximated or described as "rational" 
entities, others, like the Heuristics and Bias theory assume 
that humans have cognitive limitations that prohibit them 
from being rational and they are emotional and subjective all 
the time [6].  Decision makers appear to be good analyzers, 
learn from their previous experiences and use their schemas 
efficiently. However, decision makers do not consider all the 
alternatives, but instead, consider only a few and look at them 
consequentially instead of simultaneously [9]. Accordingly, 
studies of decision models in real world show that not all 
alternatives are known, not all consequences are considered 
and not all preferences are evoked at the same time [8]. All of 
these factors helped derive the concept of bounded 
rationality. 
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 A. Bounded (Limited) Rationality 
Herbert Simon pointed out that most people are only 
partly rational, and are mostly emotional or irrational when 
they make decisions [24]. His theory is known as the theory 
of “Bounded Rationality”. Bounded rationality is experienced 
in formulating and solving complex problems and in 
processing information including receiving, storing, 
retrieving, and transmitting information [8, 25, 26]. Daniel 
Kahneman proposes bounded rationality as a model to 
overcome some of the limitations of the rational-agent 
models in economic literature [26]. 
The concept of bounded rationality implies that we cannot 
feasibly consider the perfect rational decisions in practice to 
the finite computational resources available for making them. 
Even if decision makers try to make rational decisions, they 
will be constrained by limited cognitive capabilities. 
Therefore, actions may not be completely rational even with 
the best of intentions and efforts [9]. At the same time, 
heuristics do not come completely from emotions and against 
rationality [19], they come from long retained rational 
experiences that have been saved and previously 
implemented in our cognitive system [24]. Heuristics are 
sophisticated reasoning tools based on schemas (or mental 
databases) that experts hone over years of experience and that 
help them solve every day problems and make fast and urgent 
decisions [24].  
More research suggests to not ignore the usefulness of 
heuristics [4,5,6,21,27,28,30] and states that heuristics can 
help experts solve problems that they face in their domain. 
Gorgy Polya, a mathematician who researches mathematical 
problem solving, argues that formality of mathematical proof 
has little to do with real life problem solving. She describes 
how decision makers find problem solutions by using 
heuristics or what she calls “general strategies for attacking a 
problem that does not guarantee the solutions” [16]. Simon 
[24] states that intuition is not a magical sixth sense, but a 
sophisticated form of reasoning,  which allows us to think 
and analyze the situation even  if  we don’t have previous 
experience and we are not “slaves” to our feelings or 
intuitions. Klein [5] added that we should treat intuition as a 
skill that can be acquired and taught.  
Gerd Gigerenzer argues that most decision theorists that 
came after Simon and who have discussed bounded 
rationality have not really followed Simon's ideas about 
bounded rationality. Instead, they have researched either how 
decisions are sub-optimal because of limitations of human 
rationality, or they have constructed elaborate optimizing 
models of how people might cope with their inability to 
optimize [2, 4, 21].  
As an alternative, Gigerenzer proposed to examine simple 
alternatives to a full rationality analysis as a mechanism for 
decision-making. He, with his colleagues, has shown that, in 
some cases, such simple heuristics frequently lead to better 
decisions than the theoretically optimal procedure. These 
models are known as “Fast and frugal decision models”.  
 
B.  Fast and Frugal decision models 
Gigerenzer and colleagues have identified a new class of 
cognitive heuristics that can be logically applied. Rather than 
starting with a normative process model, they started with 
fundamental psychological mechanisms. The “fast and 
frugal” techniques that they identified, adaptively match the 
informational structure and demands of decision makers’ 
environments [25] 
Fast and frugal heuristics are simple task specific decision 
strategies that are ecologically rational because they exploit 
structures of information in the environment. They are 
founded in evolved psychological capacities such as memory 
and the perceptual system. They are fast, frugal and simple 
enough to operate effectively when time, information and 
computation might be limited, precise enough to be modeled 
computationally and powerful enough to model good 
reasoning  [27].  
In the classical decision making process, all attributes 
should be analyzed, scored and weighted for all options. This 
process can be complex and exhausting for decision makers 
when the number of options and attributes increase. Because 
most traditional rational models of inference, from linear 
multiple regression models to neural networks, try to find 
some optimal integration of all information available, they 
take into account “every bit of information.” Since decision 
makers do not usually have sufficient information and time to 
do such processes, the satisfying algorithms, those who 
follow the rational theory of probabilistic mental models 
(PMM), don’t search for the optimal solutions, but instead 
they look for the best solution that would fit with the needs 
and satisfy the decision maker [2, 28]. In this technique the 
decision maker, or the computer, need to search their 
memories for relevant information. They don’t have to 
integrate them, but rather a substitution of pieces of 
information will be sufficient [2]. One example of such 
simple heuristics is the Take the Best Algorithm (TTB).  
TTB is based on a rule of thumb that we, as human 
beings, apply in our life: “Try to take the best and ignore the 
rest.” The simple idea of this algorithm is to treat what we 
know as important, ignore what we do not know and start by 
testing the most important cues. Once a differentiation is 
found between the alternatives, stop looking for other cues 
and choose the alternative that satisfies the tested criteria. A 
number of psychological experiments suggest that people 
follow this rule and often base their intuitive judgment on a 
single good reason [28].  
Gigerenzer and his research group have analyzed the 
quality of results of TTB [4] by asking people to decide 
which of two cities has a larger population. Employing the 
TTB algorithms, people would first check if they know one 
of the two cities. If they do, they pick the one they know. If 
they do not know either city or both, they search for 
additional cues, such as “city has a major league soccer team” 
or “city has a university” until they find one that helps them 
discriminate between the two choices. In this case, they 
decide and ignore all other potentially relevant cues. TTB is 
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 thus based on satisfying, rather than optimization: decision-
makers choose the first object that satisfies their objectives 
without surveying all possible alternatives. Gigerenzer et al. 
tested the algorithm through simulation and compared the 
results to other algorithms that integrate all information and 
are considered to be rational. For the simulation, they 
combined pairs of different cities from a set of 84 German 
cities to come up with 3,403 city pairs.  In addition to the 
recognition cue, they identified nine cues that had different 
levels of ecological validity and different discrimination 
rates. To model limited knowledge of cue values, they 
simulated classes of people with different percentage of 
knowledge about cues, which is associated with different 
values of recognizing objects. They compared the TTB 
algorithm with other decision algorithms, such as weighted 
tallying, which weighs and combines all alternatives, and a 
regression model. They found that TTB algorithm drew as 
many correct inferences as any of the integration models, 
including the regression model, and performed substantially 
better than linear models. Figure 2 shows the results of the six 
tested models. 
 
 
Figure2. The results of TTB algorithm compared with other decision models, 
TTB  performed as good as some cumulated models and outperformed others  
[2]. 
 
Gigerenzer tested TTB again, but instead of predicting the 
population of a city, he used it to predict the smallest dropout 
rate in a comparison of 57 high schools in Chicago, Illinois, 
based on 18 cues [4]. 
From these two experiments, the simple heuristic of “one 
good reason”, or Take the Best algorithm, proved better and 
generated faster results than evaluating all reasons in 
predicting what we do not know. On average, TTB algorithm 
tested three clues before it stopped searching and picked a 
choice, which they found to be an acceptable choice. The 
complex strategies that use all weights and all clues perform 
better than the TTB when there is enough information about 
the alternatives and tested criteria but they take a longer time 
[2, 4].  
Gigerenzer explains the reason behind these results as 
follows: “in uncertain, a complex strategy can fail because it 
explains too much in hindsight. Only part of information is 
valuable for future, and the art of intuition is to focus on that 
part and ignore the rest. A simple rule that relies only on the 
best clue has a good chance of hitting on that useful piece of 
information”[4].  
 
C. Researches on other heuristics: 
Building on Gigerenzer et al., many studies have tested 
the efficiency of simple heuristics in decision making. These 
studies mathematically tested model results and compared 
them with compensatory mathematical decision models.  
Two different approaches are used to assess the quality of 
heuristics; the first group compares the results of using 
simple heuristics against commonly used decision models 
and against logistic regression. Katsikopoulos and Fasolo 
[29], and Smith and Gilhooly [23] use fast and frugal 
heuristics to develop multi-attribute models and decision 
trees to help caregivers diagnose medical conditions and 
prescribe the right medications. The fast and frugal models 
have been tested on simulated data, as well as on real cases: 
Katsikopoulos and Fasolo’s model registers a performance 
accuracy of 72% of the cases, while the logistic regression 
system achieved 75% accuracy, but took a longer time [29]. 
Smith and Gilhooly [23] found that their fast and frugal 
decision model based on matching heuristics achieved almost 
as good results as the logistic regression model, but was 
faster and more flexible in making decisions about the 
medication that should be prescribed for depression. 
The second group of studies researched the quality of 
forecasts that are based on fast and frugal methods. Anderson 
and Edman [30] tested the fast and frugal method by 
comparing the performance and information process 
strategies of experts and non-experts when predicting results 
in the 2002 World Cup soccer tournament. From this 
experiment that included 250 participants with different 
levels of knowledge, they concluded that participants who 
had obtained a lot of information about the teams did not 
outperform those who had no such information, because just 
a slice of information was enough to make good prediction. 
In a study on intelligence analysis and early warning 
systems, Bradley [31] used only three indicators to forecast 
conflict escalation, instead of drawing on dozens of indicators 
like the majority of early warning systems. Traditional 
approaches necessitate access to substantial amounts of data, 
most of which is highly aggregated and/or of poor quality. 
Bradley used the results from his “good enough” model to 
argue that “both the conflict early warning and intelligence 
communities should consider the value of fast and frugal 
analysis.” 
In business forecasting, Astebro and Elhedhli [32] have 
tested the success of simple heuristics in forecasting 
commercial success of new products. They tracked the 
success of 561 projects which  have been evaluated between 
1989 and 1994 by experts from Canadian Invention 
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 Assessment Program (IAP). They found that a simple 
decision heuristics (conjunctive decision model) to forecast if 
early-stage R&D projects are commercialized succeeds in 
predicting 86.0% of the projects correctly; experts predict 
82.6% correct, while a log-linear additive statistical model 
correctly predicts 78.6%. They tried to link these results to 
the number of cues used for the forecast and found that the 
experts’ forecasting rules uses 33 out of 37 possible cues, 
while the model with the best forecast of project success only 
uses 21 cues. In addition, models that use all cues do not 
perform as well as those that use a selected set of cues. These 
results support other researches which call for using less 
attributes [6], because the use of more information than what 
they call “optimal” can incorrectly affect the forecasts.  
 
V. DISCUSSION 
 
Even though heuristics can lead to deviations from 
optimal decisions, recent psychological and social decision 
research is increasingly interested in decision makers’ use of 
heuristics.  Heuristics are rules of thumbs for problem solving 
[9] that do not guarantee optimal solutions [16]. They do, 
however, have accuracies close to more complex decision 
rules and seem particularly useful in difficult decision making 
contexts [32] especially when there is uncertainty over  the 
future or when we need to make quick decisions [21].  A 
class of very simple decision heuristics, the so-called “fast 
and frugal” heuristics, is currently at the center of the 
academic debate and has found their way into practitioners’ 
literature. They seem to prove that in an unpredictable 
environment¸ complex problems do not always need complex 
solutions[4].  
Many managerial decisions are highly uncertain and 
involve a large number of attributes, but many practitioners 
base their decisions on only a few, mainly financial criteria, 
such as return on investment [33]. They furthermore do not 
always use systematic approaches to information gathering 
and decision making, but often rely on readily available 
internal information and “gut feeling”. At some decision 
points, the gathering of information for a full-blown multi-
criteria decision model could result in long time delays and 
high costs, and, if decision errors are “cheap” because they 
will soon be caught at a subsequent checkpoint, it is 
acceptable to sacrifice decision quality and choose a simpler, 
fast, and less expensive evaluation method. Simple decision 
heuristics are therefore potentially useful for some 
managerial decisions.  
 
VI. FUTURE STUDIES 
 
A complete theory of Fast and Frugal decision making is 
not available, but formal properties of simple heuristics have 
been studied to some extent. Future research needs to adopt 
the simplicity and problem solving qualities of fast and frugal 
heuristics and develop fast and cheap decision models that fill 
the need of managers in many areas.  
One application area of great practical relevance is the 
fuzzy front-end of new product development, which consists 
of a series of decisions. Many decisions are highly uncertain 
and involve a large number of attributes, but many 
practitioners base their decisions on only a few of them [33].  
Many practitioners express dissatisfaction with the front-end 
process  [34, 35], which is presently not fast and not 
successful enough. An in-depth study of the potentials of 
simple heuristics in the fuzzy front end is required. I will 
allow us to answer the following research questions: How do 
expert managers in the fuzzy front-end make decisions and 
what are the heuristics they use? Are there simple non-
compensatory selection heuristics that can be effectively used 
in front-end decisions? Can we develop decision aids for the 
front-end that are based on simple heuristics and achieve 
good decision results? 
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